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1The Dynamic Nature of Survival Determinants in E-commerce
Abstract
Longitudinal data on 460 e-tailers are used to test the dynamic effects of survival 
determinants in e-commerce.  The model includes elements of competitive strategy, industry 
structure, firm and product characteristics, and the macro environment.  The study 
demonstrates that very few of the factors affecting survival have a constant effect over time.  
For example, order of entry advantages are observed, but they are short-lived meaning that e-
tailers cannot rely on early entry as a strategic move in the long run.  This finding reconciles 
the arguments about the existence of pioneering advantages in the empirical literature.  
Retailers benefit from multiple channels throughout their lives.  E-tailers with more media 
presence also seem to survive longer.  Being publicly owned and selling products with digital 
characteristics present advantages for e-tailers only in the beginning years, but they are not 
sustainable over long time periods.  Survival chances decrease with higher competitive 
density, market growth rate, and equity market level at the time of entry.  Conversely, 
economic growth tends to increase survival chances.  The study also finds an inverted-U 
relationship between the hazard of exit and firm age.  The conclusion section discusses the 
implications of the time-varying nature of survival determinants.
Key words: Survival analysis, order of entry, online retailing.
2Introduction
It is important to study the evolution of an industry for several reasons.  First, it is 
essential for managers to know at what stage they join the industry, because this will have 
different implications for their marketing strategies.  For example, a growing industry is far 
more turbulent and risky than a mature one.  Second, if managers recognize the effect of 
certain survival determinants, they can plan better strategies for exit or exit avoidance.  For 
example, more vulnerable firms with unique offerings can seek alliances with bigger 
companies.  Or they can purposefully delay their entry until after the turbulent period in the 
industry and find a favorable niche in the market.  Third, managers need to be aware of the 
time-varying nature of factors affecting their strategy.  A beneficial aspect of the initial entry 
strategy might diminish its effect over time.  Reversely, overcoming some obstacles in the 
introductory stage may have positive returns in later stages.  This calls for an evolutionary 
perspective on the investigation of survival determinants. 
Most of the existing industry evolution studies have looked at the static nature of 
survival determinants (Agarwal 1997; Klepper 2002).  One exception is a study by Agarwal, 
Sarkar, and Echambadi (2002) looking at contemporaneous effects of survival determinants.  
In addition, while the concept of strategizing according to the different stages of the PLC has 
been accepted as a basic postulate in marketing, the time-dependent nature of survival 
determinants has been largely ignored in the literature.  At the same time, survival of online 
firms has been a subject of considerable debate in the popular and managerial press.  
Connecting the missing dots, this study aims at investigating different factors deemed 
to be important in the online retailing setting (Mahajan, Srinivasan, and Wind 2002; 
Varadarajan and Yadav 2002).  The analysis utilizes population ecology tools popular in the 
organizational behavior literature.  It is based on a longitudinal database of 460 e-tailers 
examining their entry and possible exit through September 2003.  The study employs duration 
3models to estimate how elements of competitive strategy, industry structure, firm 
characteristics, product characteristics, and the macro environment influence e-tailer survival 
and how these effects change over time.  In summary, the contributions of the paper are these:
1. The study provides an empirical test of Varadarajan and Yadav’s (2002) 
theoretical framework.
2. It tests the dynamic nature of the different internal and external factors 
affecting firms’ survival in a duration modeling framework.  This allows 
for the testing of the time-varying nature of both covariates and coefficients 
– a new approach in the marketing literature.  
3. It fills a gap in the order of entry literature by: a) conducting the study in a 
service industry as opposed to the existing bias in the order of entry 
literature towards new product introductions (Lieberman and Montgomery 
1998) and b) tracing the order of entry effect over time.  Further, the use of 
hazard rate estimation also answers the call of Lieberman and Montgomery 
(1998) for greater use of such tools, which would “denote a healthy shift 
away from the excessive emphasis on market share in first-mover studies.” 
(p.1116)
Theoretical Framework
Varadarajan and Yadav (2002) propose a theoretical framework for integrating the 
new realities of the Internet into marketing strategy.  They describe how various drivers and 
outcomes of competitive strategy change with the advent of the Internet in business strategies.  
This theoretical framework is applied to the online retailing setting to explore the dynamic 
nature of different drivers of firm survival.  In most general terms, business performance 
depends on competitive strategy, industry, firm, product, and buyer characteristics.  Buyer 
4characteristics serve as a general setting of the model – individual consumers (vs. 
organizational), diminishing information search cost, diminishing information asymmetry –
but they are not explicitly modeled.1  A sketch of the model is outlined in Figure 1.  The 
determinants of e-tailer survival are: competitive strategy – order of entry, distribution 
channels, and publicity; industry structure – number of competitors and market growth rate; 
firm characteristics – firm age and ownership; product characteristics – products with digital 
characteristics and search vs. experience goods; macro environment – economic growth and 
equity market level.  The inclusion of some of the variables is also based on the theoretical 
framework for success in online retailing proposed by Mahajan et al. (2002).  
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
Given the dynamic nature of the online marketplace, it is appropriate to explore these 
determinants in the context of industry evolution.  For this purpose, the current study employs 
a duration model.  The incorporation of not only time-varying covariates, but also time-
varying coefficients to trace the dynamics of survival determinants is a new methodological 
approach in marketing.  There are several developments like greater information richness and 
lower information search costs associated with the Internet channel that justify the selection 
of the factors presented in Figure 1 and the exploration of their dynamic nature (Varadarajan 
and Yadav 2002).  These are discussed in detail in the sections below.
Competitive Strategy
Order of Entry 
It would be safe to say that the idea of first mover advantages permeated the 
marketing field through the theoretical-analytical economic framework on the subject (e.g. 
Schmalensee 1982).  This framework advanced arguments that first-movers gain advantages 
because of their ability to raise entry barriers due to scale effects, advertising, consumer 
5switching costs, etc.  The entry barriers allow pioneers to extend their “natural” monopoly 
period and thus be able to accrue profits that would later help them successfully fend off 
competitors.  Early marketing studies based on these arguments (Robinson and Fornell 1985;
Urban et al. 1986) did find that market pioneers were rewarded by long term market share 
advantages.  
Subsequent studies (Lilien and Yoon 1990; Golder and Tellis 1993) challenged these 
findings based on survival bias indicating that many true pioneers face the risk of failure.  The 
controversy has continued in more recent studies: Robinson and Min (2002) show that 
pioneers in industrial markets have higher survival rates compared to second entrants; and 
Boulding and Christen (2003) conclude that the market share advantage of pioneering is often 
offset by the greater cost disadvantage.  
Taking a different perspective, Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson (1992) point out that 
the order of entry effect is conditional on industry characteristics and strategy variables.  
Further, there is another largely overlooked factor in the above mentioned studies – the time 
effect (exceptions are Lilien and Yoon 1990 and Gielens and Dekimpe 2001).  The underlying 
question is not whether first mover advantages exist, but how long they last.  Collectively, all 
of the above studies seem to support the idea that a later entrant with a superior composite 
product backed by large advertising expenditures can overcome the pioneer.  The longer we 
track industries, the more likely is the entry of a superior late mover (e.g. Golder and Tellis 
1993).  
In other words, early entrants might be experiencing artificial advantages in the early 
period after their introduction, which can easily disappear once the industry reaches 
equilibrium.  The following comparison helps to illustrate the above argument.  Kalyanaram 
and Urban (1992) show that later entrants reach their asymptotic market share at a faster rate 
compared to early entrants.  In a sense, this happens because early entrants have to “wait” for 
6the late followers to enter, which eventually brings market shares to their asymptotes.  
Consequently, during the “waiting” period, early entrants have less competitors and as a result
higher market share2.  Similarly, early entrants may be less prone to early exit, because the 
market conditions are not so adverse and survival is easier.  However, with time and the entry 
of more competitors, market conditions become more adverse and the advantages enjoyed by
early entrants under milder conditions disappear.  Since late followers enter under worse 
market conditions, they tend to exit more often early after their entry and the ones who 
survive are well equipped to successfully challenge their predecessors.  This can be especially 
relevant for technologically intensive industries (Kerin et al. 1992).  Although some followers 
may be at disadvantage when they enter the industry, they may be better adapters and 
ultimately even perform better than pioneers.  Thus, first mover advantages may be easier to 
observe in the early stages of a firm’s entry into a new industry.  
The current study puts the above idea to a test and fills two gaps in the literature.  
First, it answers two calls by Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) of enhancing the first mover 
advantage literature – by investigating the online retailing industry it goes away from the 
product centered research and by employing the evolutionary perspective to investigate the 
survival of firms it goes away from the emphasis on market share.  Second, it traces the order 
of entry effect over time.  
In line with Kerin et al.’s (1992) proposition about the nature of order of entry 
advantages in technologically intensive industries, it is worthwhile pointing at several 
characteristics of the online environment that suggest that early entrants’ advantages may be 
short lived.  First, the Internet lowers consumer switching costs (Bakos 1997), which has been 
shown to shorten first mover advantages, because consumers can easily switch to later 
entrants.  In addition, the greater information richness and diminished information asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers (Varadarajan and Yadav 2002) would make it easier for 
7consumers to explore new, unfamiliar options, which can steer them away from early 
entrants.  Accordingly, while consumers might have been hesitant to patronize Overstock.com 
in the year 2000 (the company launched its store at the end of 1999) in face of the uncertainty
about the e-tailer’s future, over time the e-tailer managed to attract enough customers with its 
quality merchandise at closeout prices to become one of the top 20 online retailers in 2004.  
Second, online retailing has short time periods between entries, which has been shown to 
shorten first mover advantages (Huff and Robinson 1994).  A third factor that points in the 
same direction is the high market development costs – since the Internet channel was a radical 
innovation, market development costs are usually high, which can benefit later entrants
(Lilien and Yoon 1990).  These factors suggest that early mover advantages in online retailing 
may be limited and dissolve quickly.  
Contributing to the diminishing advantage of early entry might be a second generation 
of entrants – firms that enter after a massive wave of exits and occupy market space vacated 
by the exitors.  Agarwal et al. (2002) cite evidence from prior studies that the mature phase is 
characterized by a transformational change that drastically alters market conditions in the 
industry.  During the mature phase, the industry infrastructure is well established, knowledge 
is widespread, and procedures are standardized and routinized.  By and large, mature phase 
entry is at a lower rate and qualitatively different.  In the case of e-commerce, the mature 
phase coincides with a period of low resource munificence (Park and Mezias 2005).  
Therefore, the wave of late entrants are well prepared to resist turbulences, do not depend on 
exuberant financing, and come with lessons from the shakeout.  In addition, uncertainty is 
highly reduced compared to the growth phase and incumbents tend to be less responsive to
new opportunities because of inertial tendencies.  This allows later entrants to find strategic 
niches and coexist with incumbents who have survived the turbulent period.  
8Based on the above arguments, two hypotheses are developed.  The first one addresses 
the order of entry effect and its changing nature over time.  The second one follows the 
theoretical lines of two distinctive industrial regimes cited by Agarwal et al. (2002). It argues
that firms who enter after the massive wave of exit of an industry have an advantage.  
H1: Order of entry is positively related to e-tailers’ probability of exit , but the 
effect diminishes over time.
H2: Growth phase entrants have a higher probability of exit compared to 
mature phase entrants.
Distribution Channels
The progress of e-commerce boosted the importance of distribution channels not only 
as delivery vehicles, but also as communication, trial, and innovation channels.  While the 
electronic channel opened many new opportunities for companies, it also highlighted the 
value of a physical channel.  In reality, not all companies can utilize more than one channel.  
What is the importance of a multi-channel strategy in online retailing?  In the early years of 
the development of e-commerce, pundits were predicting the dominance of single channel e-
tailers (e-tailers who operate only online stores) over old-economy clicks-and-mortars.  Then, 
after the highly publicized failures of some of the single channel e-tailers, the bets leaned 
towards multi-channel e-tailers.  
Theoretically, multi-channel retailers are expected to fare better.  Various studies in 
economics (Geroski 1995), management (Klepper and Simons 2000), and marketing 
(Robinson and Min 2002) point out that across different industries entrants who have existing 
parent companies are more successful.  The success is related to the resource base of the 
parent companies.  In addition, Mahajan et al. (2002) theorize that online retailers with 
existing offline experience would perform better than single-channel e-tailers because of their 
existing market-based assets that include branding and customer relationships.
9Among the advantages of multi-channel vs. single-channel e-tailers are the 
opportunity of brand equity transfer, improved customer relationships, and cross-channel 
synergies.  Multi-channel retailers’ consumers are already familiar with their brand name.  
This makes the online extensions more trustworthy.  They can benefit from cross-channel 
promotional activities like incentive offers for their customers to shop online.  Showrooms 
are also a big asset for categories for which touch and feel is important like apparel, furniture, 
etc.  Because of the higher trust factor and existing loyal customers, multi-channel e-tailers 
may be able to charge higher prices as well.  Thus, over time multi-channel firms will have a 
higher survival probability compared to single channel e-tailers.  This yields:
H3: Single-channel e-tailers have a higher probability of exit compared to 
multi-channel e-tailers.
Publicity
Publicity is part of the promotional mix of companies and is often correlated 
with advertising spending.  Nevertheless, the effect of publicity on company performance is 
more frequently ignored than accounted for.  Duncan and Moriarty (1998) point out that 
message sources are quite influential in shaping consumers’ beliefs about companies.  In the 
Internet specific domain, there are several studies showing the positive relationship between 
publicity and web site traffic (e.g. Ilfeld and Winer (2002) and Drèze and Zufryden (2004)).  
Moreover, a research study conducted by AT&T showed that news coverage is as important 
as advertising for new customer acquisitions (Jeffries-Fox).
If increased publicity leads to increased web site traffic, then we can expect that 
higher web site traffic translates into higher sales, which would make e-tailers more viable.  
In general, publicity is a function of the PR efforts of the company, the company’s size and 
visibility.  Companies that are bigger and spend more on advertising are more visible and 
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more newsworthy hence they attract more media coverage.  All these factors can enhance the 
survival chances of a firm.  This allows for the following hypothesis:
H4: Publicity is negatively related to e-tailers’ probability of exit.
Industry Structure
Competitive Density
The development of the following hypothesis about the effect of the competitive 
environment is another response to the call of Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) for “cross-
fertilization between strategy and marketing” (p.1122).  While the strategy and organizational 
ecology literature have produced prolific studies of population density effects, the marketing 
literature has paid more attention to the strategic actions of firms.  Yet there is no strategic 
decision that is isolated from the competitive environment and from the particular 
evolutionary stage of the industry. 
In the organizational ecology literature, contemporaneous competitive density 
(hereafter called competitive density) is the number of competitors in a product category in a 
given time period.  In most general terms, the density-dependent model postulates that the 
intensity of competition in a population varies according to the number of organizations.  
Thus, if increasing density increases organizational exit rates, the environment is competitive.  
On the other hand, if increasing density increases survival rates, this indicates mutualism 
(Baum and Mezias 1992).  Some studies have found a U-shaped relationship between 
competitive density and failure risk accounting for legitimizing and competitive forces 
(Carroll and Hannan 1989).  The main premise of these studies is that at the initial low 
population levels, creditors, suppliers, employees, and customers will be cautious when 
dealing with newly established firms decreasing their survival chances (Aldrich 1999).  With 
the establishment of the industry, survival rates increase until a maximum capacity is reached 
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when the market cannot support so many competitors and exit rates increase.  Citing a 
number of organizational studies, Aldrich (1999) points out that the U-shaped relationship is 
not applicable to all industries.  
Perhaps the strongest argument for e-tailing being one of the industries where the 
theory of a U-shape does not hold is the high environmental munificence marking the 
formative stages of the industry (Park and Mezias 2005).  The period of high munificence
confutes the hostile environment characteristic of the early stage of some industries where the 
U-shaped relationship between population density and exit is observed.  
According to economic theory, competition increases on the continuum from 
monopoly to perfect competition, i.e. ceteris parabus – the higher the number of firms, the 
higher the competitive intensity.  Many empirical studies confirm that price-cost margins tend 
to be much lower in markets characterized by high number of competitors (Besanko et al. 
2003).  This yields the following hypothesis:
H5: Competitive density is positively related to e-tailers’ probability of exit.
Market Growth Rate
While growing markets are characterized by increased sales that would imply fewer 
chances of e-tailers exiting the market, high-growth markets also attract many competitors.  
Agarwal and Bayus (2002) show that in various industries firm takeoff precedes sales takeoff.  
This means that markets with high sales growth rates are more competitive.  Day, Fein, and 
Ruppersberger (2003) also observe that high growth markets attract followers who are “naïve 
about the barriers to entry and don’t realize how many others are also poised to enter at the 
same time” (p.131).  In summary, even though the growth of a market increases the size of 
the pie, it has to be sliced into thinner slices, which leaves the question of the effect of market 
growth rate on survival open.  This leads to two alternative hypotheses:
H6a: Market growth rate is negatively related to e-tailers’ probability of exit.
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H6b: Market growth rate is positively related to e-tailers’ probability of exit.
Firm Characteristics
E-tailer Age
Firm age is another variable that has been heavily used in the strategy/organizations 
literature, but has been marginalized in marketing.  Firm age reflects the experience and 
organizational knowledge accumulated by a company.  Evolutionary models add the caveat 
that age represents accumulated experience and organizational knowledge in historically-
specific environments (Aldrich 1999).  Subsequent events build on the routines and 
competences as well as the emotions characteristic of the founding period.  They become the 
standard against which future events are evaluated (Aldrich 1999).  
Because many Internet retailers entered during the period of high environmental 
munificence, their initial endowments were substantial.  That might have created a spirit of 
exuberance not easily matched by subsequent events.  Prior research has observed that firms 
can grow rapidly and adaptively while the initial endowments last and when the endowments 
are exhausted, growth slows down or some firms may be even forced to exit the industry 
(Aldrich 1999).  This is the basic argument of the liability of adolescence theory (Henderson 
1990).  Clearly, the situation in the Internet retailing population was similar – with the
financial cushion of venture capital or backing from parent companies, exit rates in the 
formative years are low.  As e-tailers burn through their initial capital, exit rates increase over 
time.  Once an equilibrium is achieved, exit rates eventually decline.  This scenario is 
reflected in the following hypothesis:  




Since the development of e-commerce was closely associated with the boom and burst 
of the equity markets, we are bound to investigate the possible differences among publicly 
traded companies and private ones.  Maug (2001) states that publicly owned companies are 
better off when outside investors have better access to information that is useful for future 
capital budgeting decisions.  These are the cases when industry information is more 
important.  Maug (2001) continues that under these scenarios public firms can use the 
information aggregated by the stock market and communicated back to the firm by the stock 
price.  Eventually, this information helps the firm make more informed decisions.  Since 
online retailing was a new industry, firms required plenty of outside information to judge its 
viability.  This means that public firms were in a better position.  
Another argument in favor of publicly owned companies is their resource base.  If the 
market favors the new technology, as was the case with e-commerce, they can raise even 
more capital to adopt the new technology.  However, this would matter more in the early
stages.  Once the companies establish themselves, the difference in survival probabilities 
between public and private companies should disappear.  When competition becomes more 
intense, firm-specific information would be as critical as market-specific information, thus 
leveling the playing field between public and private companies.  Private companies that have 
survived the turbulent period should not be less viable than public companies.  This is 
supported by many studies cited by Vining and Boardman (1992) that find no difference in 
profitability between private and public firms.  Thus:
H8: Publicly owned e-tailers have a lower probability of exit compared to 
privately owned e-tailers, but the effect diminishes over time.
Product Characteristics
Products with Digital Characteristics
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Mahajan et al. (2002) theorize that one of the success factors in e-tailing is selling 
digital vs. physical products.  They define digital products as products that can be digitized 
and transmitted electronically.  Examples include music, electronic books, software, and 
video.  These products can be efficiently distributed online, because they do not require 
physical space for storage, consumers can get all the information about the products online, 
and they can be instantaneously delivered electronically.  Therefore, these products should do 
better in the online channel.  However, as recognized by Mahajan et al. (2002), the 
technology has not reached the level where these products are distributed exclusively in their 
digital form.  Another reason for the predominantly physical form of the products is the fear 
of piracy and easy duplication of the products in their digitized form.  
As noted by Varadarajan and Yadav (2002), physical and digital product substitutes 
may co-exist.  Most of the retailers who sell digital products online also sell the products in 
their physical form. In fact, most of their sales come from the distribution of physical 
products.  Therefore, it is useful to look at the characteristics of the physical substitutes of 
digital products.  We can refer to these products as products with digital characteristics.
These products are standardized, of uniform quality, touch and feel is not important; 
and they are easy and cheap to ship.  Many e-commerce pioneers started selling products in 
these categories.  The universality of the products, however, does not leave much room for 
differentiation.  This implies that the advantages of e-tailers selling products with digital 
characteristics will dissipate with time.  Furthermore, as customers become more comfortable 
with the online shopping environment, they will be spending more money on products for 
which touch and feel is important.  E-tailers of such products who win customers’ trust in 
their first years of operation should be at an equal footing with e-tailers of products with 
digital characteristics later on in their lives.  This effect of time is incorporated in the next 
hypothesis:
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H9: E-tailers of products with digital characteristics have a lower probability 
of exit compared to other e-tailers, but the effect diminishes over time.
Search Goods
The marketing discipline has adopted the classification of Nelson (1970) of search and 
experience goods in relation to the consumer information search process.  Search goods do 
not need to be examined before purchase, because they can be fully described, whereas 
experience goods have to be tried by consumers before they are fully evaluated.  Since the 
Internet deprives consumers of the tactility characteristic of products, it becomes even more 
difficult for consumers to evaluate experience goods.  Therefore it should be expected that e-
tailers selling search goods would perform better than e-tailers selling experience goods.  This 
is the argument presented by Mahajan et al. (2002). 
On the other hand, Varadarajan and Yadav (2002) propose that for products for which 
the tactile feedback is important, the opportunity to convey more information over the 
Internet is likely to benefit the sales of these products.  This argument becomes even more 
valid when customers accumulate sufficient experience with e-tailers.  That is why the 
distinction between search and experience goods might disappear over time.  In reality, most 
products fall on a continuum between search and experience characteristics3.  If search is on 
the lower end of the continuum and experience is on the higher, then:
H10: E-tailers’ score on the search-experience continuum of products is 





In times of general economic prosperity, firms should find survival easier.  Golder and 
Tellis (2004) hypothesize that a change in the economic environment would cause a change in 
sales in the same direction.  Increasing sales creates a more nurturing environment for firms, 
which lessens the probability of exit.  In a similar line of thought, Baker and Kennedy (2002) 
document the negative relationship between GDP growth rate and firms’ distress delisting 
rates from the major stock exchanges.  
Economic growth is reflected by the equity markets.  In the case of Internet retailing, 
the NASDAQ index played a special role, because it tracks many technology companies. In 
addition, almost all of the e-commerce companies that issued public stock joined NASDAQ4.  
The NASDAQ index can be also associated with the availability of venture capital.  High 
growth rates are associated with high demand expectations that make venture capitalists relax 
their criteria and pour more money into new ventures.  This would generally mean that 
periods of high growth in the stock market are associated with greater financial stability that 
would decrease the chances of failure.  This leads to the following hypothesis:
H11:  Economic growth is negatively related to e-tailers’ probability of exit.
Equity Market Level
Equity market levels signal market expectations for future demand5.  Based on the 
above comments, NASDAQ was a particularly strong signal for e-tailers.  Expectations of 
high growth markets usually attract many entrants to those markets.  Day et al. (2003) point 
out that during the boom period “an unsustainable glut of competitors is attracted by forecasts 
of high growth and promises of exceptional returns” (p.131).  Botman et al. (2004) report 
several papers in the finance literature documenting that firms that go public during 
“windows of opportunity” characterized by relatively high equity market levels underperform 
relative to other offerings.  These “opportunity windows” usually arise because of over-
optimism about the earnings potential of young growth companies.  The authors find a 
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positive relationship between market level at the time of offering measured as the average 
value of the NASDAQ composite index during the month of offering and a firm’s hazard of 
exit (Botman et al. 2004).  
The flip side of venture capital availability is that riskier projects get financed, which 
leads to many premature venture creations.  This implies that e-tailers who enter during 
periods of high growth expectations tend to be less prepared to survive the adjustment period 
in the industry.  However, the ones who utilize their initial endowment wisely and concentrate 
more on their strategy and operations in their fledgling stages would have higher survival 
chances later in their lives.  Accumulating experience with customers and moving along the 
learning curve can strengthen the strategic position for companies who entered at times of 
high growth expectations.  This dynamic effect is expressed in the following hypothesis:
H12: A higher equity market level at the time of an e-tailer’s entry tends to 
increase the probability of exit, but the effect diminishes over time.
Data
The sample has 460 online retailers.  Since none of the online retailers entered the 
market before 1994, the data span January 1994 through September 2003.  Because 316 e-
tailers were still in business at the end of the period, the data are right censored.  The sample 
includes all major retailers within a category.  The categories are: Apparel, Auto, Books, 
Computer Software, Computer Hardware, Department Stores, DVDs & Videos, Electronics, 
Food & Drink, Gifts & Flowers, Health & Beauty, Home & Garden, Music, Office Supplies, 
Pet Supplies, Sports & Outdoors, Toys & Video Games.  
Based on information from the retailers’ web sites, various media sources, Yahoo’s 
finance site, and government statistics, the following data were collected: the month and year 
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of entry and exit (where applicable) for each retailer, opening monthly values of the 
NASDAQ composite index, quarterly GDP growth rate and electronic and mail order sales, 
number of media mentions from Lexis-Nexis (these are the number of articles and press 
releases mentioning the company – used to measure the publicity variable in the model), 
company ownership status, channels, and product categories.  A panel of 17 experts –
marketing faculty members at research universities – were asked to assign a score from 
1=search to 10=experience to the above mentioned product categories.  The average of their 
scores was assigned to the search-experience variable.
The average age of the survivors is 4.65 years.  The average life of the e-tailers that 
exited the industry was 2.28 years with the shortest duration lasting only one month.  Table 1 
defines the variables along with the means and standard deviations and Table 2 lists the 
length of the growth stage for the different product categories.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
[Insert Table 2 here.]
By September 2003, 144 retailers had exited the market.  A breakdown of survivors 
and exitors by product category appears in Table 2.  The sample consists of 186 single-
channel Internet retailers (110 of them exited and 76 were still alive) vs. 274 multi-channel 
retailers (34 exited and 240 were still alive); 236 publicly traded or subsidiaries of publicly 
traded companies (39 exited, 197 were still alive) vs. 224 private e-tailers (105 exited, 119
were still alive), and 109 e-tailers of products with digital characteristics.  In addition, 129 of 
the 320 e-tailers who entered during the growth stage had exited the industry by the end of the 
observation period.  Table 3 lists the Kaplan-Meyer 1, 2, 5, and 7-year survival rates in these 
categories as well as the total number of firms who have exited by the end of the observation 
period and the ones who are still in business. And Table 4 lists the survival rates by order of 
entry.  These descriptive statistics give us some preliminary insights in the hypothesized 
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relationships.  For example, survival rates decrease with order of entry, but late late entrants’ 
survival rates are almost the same as the survival rates of the whole sample.  The 
dichotomized survival rates show better outcomes for multi-channel, digital products, public 
retailers and e-tailers that enter the industry during the mature phase.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
[Insert Table 4 here.]
Model Specification and Estimation
The time to exit the online market space is censored at the end of the observation 
period.  This requires the use of a duration model since standard regression techniques would 
produce biased results.  Since two variables – market growth rate and GDP – are collected on 
a quarterly basis, the data are organized into discrete groups.  Therefore, a discrete time 
hazard model is a better choice than a continuous time model (Allison 1982).  The
complementary log-log (cloglog) regression is the discrete time alternative of the Cox 
proportional hazards regression, which has been used in multiple marketing applications (e.g. 
Helsen and Schmittlein 1993; Golder and Tellis 2004).  The cloglog formulation is commonly 
used in the population ecology framework (Agarwal et al. 2002; Henderson 1999).  There are 
several advantages of using a cloglog regression.  First, it is derived from an inherent 
continuous process, which means that the estimates are also estimates of the continuous 
duration model.  This also means that the coefficient estimates are invariant to the 
specification of time intervals (Allison 1982).  Second, the discrete time specification avoids 
some of the estimation hurdles of a continuous time model like ties – multiple firms exiting in 
the same period of time (a simple derivation of the cloglog link model from a continuous 
hazard model is available in the appendix of Beck et al. (1998)).  Third, the cloglog 
regression allows the easy incorporation of time-varying covariates.  Fourth, it can easily 
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incorporate flexible specifications of duration dependence.  The cloglog specification appears 
in Appendix 1.
Another nice feature of the discrete time duration model is that the log-likelihood 
function has the same form as in a binary regression model, which makes it easy to estimate 
(see Appendix 1).  This estimation, however, requires a re-organization of the dataset.  The 
procedure consists of creating a separate observation for each e-tailer for each quarter.  In this 
way, the unit of analysis becomes firm-quarter rather than firm.  For each firm-quarter, we 
observe the values of the covariates (some of them are fixed and some vary for different 
quarters) and whether the e-tailer has exited the industry in this quarter or not.  If the e-tailer 
is still in business in a given quarter, then the observation is censored (if an e-tailer is still 
operating at the end of the observation period, the dependent variable for each firm-quarter 
observation is 0).  If, for example, an e-tailer exits in the 7th quarter, then we have 7 firm-
quarter observations – for the first 6, the dependent variable is 0 and for the seventh, it is 1.
Grouping the sample data into discrete quarter intervals results in 7346 firm-quarter 
observations.  In this setting, e-tailer age is the time variable in the duration model – it is 
identical with the life span variable and we cannot separate the age and time effects (they are 
used interchangeably).6  Even for cases when age dependence is an empirical issue, different 
scholars in the field suggest using polynomial functions to test age dependence (e.g. Beck et 
al. 1998; Hannan 1997).  The age hypothesis introduced earlier predicts significant effects for 
a second degree polynomial in e-tailer age.  
Further, McCall (1994) points out that the requirement by the Cox proportional 
hazards regression that the coefficients are constant over time often does not make sense from 
the point of view of the pertinent theory.  Therefore the relevant covariates are interacted with 
the time variable –e-tailer age.  To investigate any non-linearity in the time effect, the 
covariates were interacted with the age variable as well as the second degree polynomial of
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age.  However, none of the second degree polynomial interactions were significant; hence, 
they are not included in the model. Since the NASDAQ variable is correlated with the order 
of entry variable (r=.78), the following two separate cloglog regression equations are 
estimated7:
log[-log(1-h(t))] = 0 + 1EAit + 2EA2it + 1OEi + 2OEi*EAit + 3SCi + 4PBi +5CDt + 
6MGt + 7Pi + 8Pi*EAit + 9Di + 10Di*EAit + 11Si + 12Si*EAit + 13ΔNt+ 
14ΔGDPt (1)
log[-log(1-h(t))] = 0 + 1EAit + 2EA2it + 1Ni + 2Ni *EAit + 3Gi + 4SCi + 5PBi + 6CDt
+ 7MGt + 8Pi + 9Pi*EAit + 10Di + 11Di*EAit + 12Si+ 13Si*EAit + 
14ΔNt+ 15ΔGDPt (2)
where EA – e-tailer age, OE – order of entry, SC – single channel, PB – publicity, CD –
competitive density, MG – market growth rate, P – public, D – digital products, S – search 
goods, N – NASDAQ, ΔN – NASDAQ growth rate, ΔGDP – GDP growth rate, G – growth 
phase entrant, h(t) – probability of exit, the subscript i stands for e-tailer and t for time 
period.8  Following the theoretical development in the hypotheses part, the modeling of e-
tailer age is the specification of the baseline hazard.  Allison (1982) describes how different 
specifications of the time variable (e-tailer age in this case) correspond to special cases of the 
discrete time model.  For example, if we include the logarithm of the age variable in the 
model, we assume Weibull distribution of time.  The left-hand side of the equation is known 
as the complementary log-log link (cloglog).  The parameters are estimated by maximizing 
the likelihood function.9  For comparison purposes, the model was also estimated using Cox 
regression with robust standard errors.  
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Results
[Insert Table 5 here.]
Table 5 provides the results for the two models.  Wald χ2 is used instead of a 
likelihood ratio test because of the robust standard error estimations, but the interpretation is
similar – a higher statistics indicates a better fitting model.  Model fitting information 
accounting for the number of parameters is also given by the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) as –2log +2r, where   is the likelihood and r is the number of parameters.  All 
things being equal, the model with smaller AIC provides a better fit to the data.
Competitive Strategy  
The impact of order of entry and its interaction with e-tailer age is estimated in Model 
1.  Since the dependent variable in the cloglog regression is the probability of exit, H1 
predicts a positive sign for the order of entry coefficient, which is confirmed.  The negative 
sign for the interaction of order of entry and e-tailer age indicates that order of entry 
advantages diminish with time supporting the theory of dissipating pioneering advantages.  
The hypothesis (H2) that mature phase entrants are more viable than growth stage entrants, is 
tested in Model 2.  The growth phase entrant coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% 
level (p=0.053) indicating weak support for H2.  As discussed, mature phase entrants face 
different conditions upon entry compared to growth phase entrants, which can help them 
occupy niches vacated during the preceding big exit wave.  In addition, because the industry 
is less turbulent (meaning lower uncertainty), late entrants may be able to devise better 
strategies.  There is a cautionary note that part of the effect may be due to data censoring.  
However, we can see that even the 2-year survival rate for growth phase entrants is 80% vs. 
90% for mature phase entrants.  Nevertheless, the issue will benefit from an investigation 
covering a wider time range.
23
As predicted by H3, single channel e-tailers have higher hazard rates.  Multi-channel 
e-tailers’ higher survival is helped by the availability of a broader resource base and 
alternative channels.  Pure Internet retailers’ lower survival rates might stem from several 
sources: a limited resources base, hurdles in building a trusted brand, steep learning curve of 
operating a retail channel, and the general obstacles faced by entrepreneurs in a new 
population.  
E-tailers that receive more media coverage seem to survive longer.  Thus, the 
predicted effect in H4 is confirmed by the statistically significant (p=0.014) negative 
coefficient of the publicity variable.  While there are some studies showing that higher levels 
of publicity lead to higher web site traffic (Ilfeld and Winer 2002, Drèze and Zufryden 2004), 
we need to keep a certain dosage of skepticism regarding the direct link between media 
coverage and survival rates.  It is very likely that bigger e-tailers with bigger marketing 
expenditures are more frequently mentioned in the media.  Because there are no data on these 
variables, it would be premature to conclude that media presence per se increases survival 
chance.
Industry Structure
The effect of competitive density on the hazard rate is positive, which confirms 
hypothesis H510 .  Increasing competition makes resources more scare and subsequently 
increases failure risk.  In addition, increasing population density signals optimistic 
expectations, which attract poorly prepared or overly optimistic founders – a process that 
ultimately results in higher exit rates (Aldrich 1999).  Increasing competition in the case of 
online retailers also forced companies to spend a large percentage of their founding capital on 
inefficient marketing campaigns contributing to their disbanding. 
The market growth covariate is positive and significant indicating an increasing 
hazard of exit with market growth – a support for H6b. This is probably due to the opposing 
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forces accompanying the market growth rate – while the market is expanding, the competition 
is growing as well, which requires higher marketing expenses thus decreasing the survival 
chance of e-tailers.  The preceding argument of a growing market attracting naïve 
entrepreneurs also explains the observed support for H6b.
Firm Characteristics
The impact of e-tailer age on the hazard rate follows an inverted-U curve, which 
supports H7.  This means that in the very beginning the hazard of exit is low and gradually 
grows over time until it starts decreasing.  This is not surprising in the online retailing 
context, because many entrants started with big initial endowments.  As they deplete their 
initial endowments, exit chances increase.  The ones who survive have had the opportunity to 
improve their strategies and to redeploy resources in a more efficient way.  As they age, the 
market turbulence is decreasing as well and survival chances increase.  
The results confirm H8 – public e-tailers have lower exit rates in the formative years, 
but with time, the effect diminishes.  It seems that the private companies, which manage to 
overcome the difficulties in the formative years and accumulate sufficient capital do not 
suffer from any disadvantages compared to public companies.  They may be even more 
flexible once proprietary firm knowledge becomes more crucial for success.
Product Characteristics
As stated in H9, e-tailers in categories of products with digital characteristics tend to 
have lower exit rates in the formative stages.  This result is not surprising, because books, 
music, video, and software were the first products to be sold online.  However, as customers 
become more comfortable with the Internet channel, the distinction disappears.  This is 
confirmed by the latest numbers about online sales – according to data released by ComScore 
Networks, the fastest growing category of online sales in 2005 was apparel and accessories, 
which increased by 36% (press release from 1/5/2006 - www.comscore.com/press/pr.asp).  
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The results indicate a marginal support for the search goods hypothesis – H10.  The 
scale used for the search variable increases from search to experience.  Thus, a positive sign 
of the coefficient means that e-tailers who sell products that stand on the higher end 
(experience) of the continuum face higher exit rates.  The coefficient is significant only in 
Model 1 and only at the 10% level (p=0.079).  The interaction with age was not supported 
indicating that the rising popularity of experience goods on the Internet (e.g. apparel) does not 
seem to be adversely affecting sales of search goods.  
Macro Environment
In order to test H11 predicting a positive relationship between economic growth and 
survivorship, the model incorporates two variables – the GDP growth rate and the NASDAQ 
composite index growth rate.  In support of H11, both coefficients are negative and highly 
significant in both models.  A better economic milieu and increasing availability of venture 
capital contribute to lower exit hazards. Since economic growth is tightly related to the level 
of resources in a particular environment, the results confirm prior findings of the relationship 
between environmental munificence and firm survival (Park and Mezias 2005).  
Looking at the equity market level represented by the fixed NASDAQ values at the 
time of e-tailer entry, the coefficient estimate in Model 2 is positive and highly significant, 
which supports the relationship proposed by H12.  This means that e-tailers entering during 
high equity market levels have higher risk of exit.  The explanation is in line with Day et al.’s 
(2003) observation that high demand expectations lured many e-tailers that did not have 
sustainable business plans to enter the market.  These results are consistent with the scenario 
proposed by Geroski and Mazzucato (2001) that online retailing experienced a speculative 
bubble, which motivated weak entry and higher exit rates.  Also, as suggested in the 
theoretical development, the effect is not constant over time –the coefficient of the interaction 
of NASDAQ and e-tailer age is negative and significant. It appears that e-tailers who 
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managed to survive the turbulent years were able to narrow the disadvantage gap. For the e-
tailers who entered with solid strategies responding to high demand expectations, the effect 
dissipates with age.
Summary and Conclusions
The current study empirically tests Varadarajan and Yadav’s (2002) theoretical 
framework of marketing strategy in the Internet context.  This is achieved by investigating 
how elements of competitive strategy, industry, firm, and product characteristics, as well as 
the macro environment affect survival of online retailers.  The unique feature of the inquiry is 
that it examines the survival determinants’ time-varying nature.  To the best of my 
knowledge, it is the first study in the marketing literature to explore time-varying coefficients 
in a duration modeling context.  Furthermore, the empirical part is based on a manually 
collected dataset spanning 460 web merchants over a time period of almost 10 years.  
The focal point of the competitive strategy variables is the order of entry effect.  This 
answers the call of Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) for more studies on service industries 
and more studies utilizing duration modeling methods.  The results are intriguing, because 
they come as a reconciliation of the debate in prior studies on the existence of first mover 
advantages.  Order of entry survival advantages are observed only in the formative stages of 
the industry. Since early entrants have fewer competitors, they are able to enjoy some initial 
advantages.  As time progresses and more competitors enter the market, the pioneering 
advantages dissipate. In addition, the results suggest that mature stage entrants may be more 
viable compared to growth stage entrants.  The explanation lies in the transformational 
change occurring in the industry and the vacated market niches after the wave of exits.  
Retailers entering the industry in the mature phase face a more stable environment and fewer 
competitors. It is still early to speculate, though, to what extent mature stage entrants will be 
27
able to learn from the best practices and the mistakes of their predecessors.  Managerially, the 
results demonstrate the fallacy of an early entry strategy as a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage.  Early category entrants like CDNow, E-toys.com, and Garden.com who enjoyed 
early category leadership are examples of this fallacy.  
On the other hand, multi-channel retailers have much higher survival rates compared 
to single channel retailers and the advantage persists over time.  This is consistent with prior 
findings that entrants with parent companies perform better than de novo entrants do.  Multi-
channel firms have a hedge against adverse conditions in a single channel, have greater 
financial resources, stronger managerial talent, and established brand equity. Therefore, their 
survival advantages are not surprising.  From a strategy formulation point, single-channel 
retailers can look for alliances with traditional retailers in their product category.  For 
example, Amazon’s alliance with Toys’R’Us allowed the e-tailer to outpace the early 
category leader E-toys.com.
Investigating the relationship between publicity and survival is another way to proxy 
for a resource related strategy variable in the absence of better data.  The estimated negative 
coefficient confirms the hypothesis prediction that e-tailers with more media presence have 
lower exit risk.  While publicity by itself can increase web site traffic and consumer trust thus 
leading to higher longevity, such a conclusion would be hasty in the absence of more data.  
Until data allow controlling for marketing expenditures and firm size, we cannot disentangle 
the nature of the publicity effect.  Nevertheless, e-tailers can only benefit from a strategically 
tailored publicity campaign, which aims at maintaining regular communication with media 
outlets.
Looking at industry structure, the results reveal that exit rates increase with increases 
in competitive density.  According to Baum and Mezias (1992), this is indicative of a 
competitive environment.  The growth of the market both in terms of firms and sales 
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increases the hazard of exit, which can be explained by intensified competition, lower 
margins, and higher marketing expenses.  It appears that the high growth market attracted 
many naïve entrants who were not able to compete successfully in a crowded marketplace.  
This is to show that entry strategies should be evaluated carefully and even more so during 
periods of high market growth.  Overoptimistic prognoses resulting from a rapidly expanding 
market can be disastrous to a firm.  Managers should be aware that high growth markets 
heighten the competition.
Age effects are interpreted as accumulation of organizational knowledge.  The 
inverted-U type relationship of exit hazard with e-tailer age is reminiscent of the liability of 
adolescence theory.  The implication is that e-tailers should make wise use of their initial 
capital and accumulate market experience and knowledge that will be useful after the initial 
honeymoon period.  Publicly traded companies seemed to be more successful during their 
early developmental stage, because they are in a better position to accumulate and interpret 
environmental knowledge.  Judging by the dissipation of the advantage with time evident in 
the results, it seems that internal company knowledge and experience become more important 
as companies age.  
Turning to product characteristics, it appears that the advantages of e-tailers selling 
products with digital characteristics were not long lived either.  In the beginning, e-tailers 
selling books, music, video, and software registered higher survival rates.  However, as 
customers’ acceptance of the online channel increased, these e-tailers found it more and more 
difficult to establish their own niches – many of them were forced to succumb to the power of 
Amazon.com.  Another classification of product categories – a scale for a continuum of 
search vs. experience characteristics – did not yield conclusive results.  There is some 
evidence to suggest that e-tailers selling products with more search characteristics fare better, 
but it is not evident across the two models.  Furthermore, the hypothesized time effect was 
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not observed.  These results demonstrate that there are no product categories that have a 
stronghold in the online channel.
Finally, the effect of macro environmental factors on firm performance should not be 
underestimated.  As expected, economic growth is beneficial to e-tailers.  While the GDP is a 
proxy of the general economic environment, the NASDAQ index growth might be indicative 
of market expectations and capital availability.  High environmental munificence increases e-
tailer survival chances.  Another important finding is the positive relationship between the 
equity market level at the time of entry and e-tailers’ exit hazard.  The idea that high demand 
expectations attract premature and weaker entry is not new (Aaker and Day 1986; Day et al. 
2003).  The current study confirms this hypothesis.  Under pressure not to miss a high growth 
opportunity, new entrants faced the challenge of differentiating themselves from existing e-
tailers and many were not able to do so.  Since the most unprepared entrants exit fast, the 
survival differences decrease over time.  Managers who are prepared to meet the ordeals of 
high-growth markets can expect brighter future at the onset of maturity.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
As any empirical study, the current one has its limitations.  One of them is the lack of 
some important variables.  The study would have greatly benefited if company information on 
size and marketing expenditures were available.  Such information, however, is not available 
in the public domain since a big part of the sample are either private companies or 
subsidiaries of larger public companies who do not provide separate information for their 
online divisions.  Currently the analysis weighs equally the failure of Violet.com with the 
survival of Amazon.com.  It would have been more meaningful within strata of companies of 
different sizes.  Further, there were speculations in the industry press that the main reason for 
the failure of many e-tailers was their unreasonably high marketing budgets.  Data availability 
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would have allowed the test of this hypothesis as well as the separation of the publicity effect.  
Another limitation of the publicity variable is that it lacks any qualitative information, i.e. we 
do not know whether the articles mentioning an e-tailer are on the positive or negative side.  
Other data of interest are the type and number of alliances.  As Varadarajan and Yadav (2002) 
point out, one of the new realities of integrating the online channel in the company’s strategy 
is the opportunity of online networks of alliances.  Part of the success of Amazon.com is due 
to the numerous alliances the e-tailer has forged over the years.  Thus, the study would have 
benefited from the inclusion of this variable as well.
Another potential limitation of the study is the interpretation of the stock market 
effect.  While it is true that in more general terms the stock market reflects the general 
situation of the economy and expectations of market growth, it is a much broader compilation 
of various factors.  This study offers one possible explanation of the NASDAQ effect.  It is an
interesting effect and future research can certainly delve more into it and offer other 
explanations.
Conclusion
Studying the evolution of online retailing illuminates important aspects of marketing 
strategy in the Internet framework.  Most importantly, this research demonstrates that as an 
industry evolves so do strategic variables.  Therefore, marketing strategy should be examined 
in its dynamic context.  From a managerial standpoint, it is important to understand that some 
factors offering strategic advantages in the formative stages can dissipate over time.  
Consequently, companies should make the adequate steps in overhauling the change in 
strategic positions.  An example is a strategic variable that has a notable presence in the
marketing literature – order of entry advantages.  Looking at its dynamic nature, the current 
study reconciles the existing opposite views on pioneering.  There are some order of entry 
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advantages, but they are short-lived and e-tailers cannot rely on early entry as a strategic 
move.  This is true even for companies that achieved national brand recognition like E-
toys.com and Garden.com.  Being first can buy a spot in the hall of fame for some time, but 
holding on to it requires more than the advantages offered by early entry.  
Another important finding is the significant influence of the external environment.  It 
stands as another warning of the perils of high growth markets.  Aaker and Day (1986) point 
out that little can be done to drown the enthusiasm surrounding a high growth industry.  
When venture capitalists and stock analysts share the enthusiasm, the effect can be 
particularly detrimental to inexperienced entrepreneurs.  Firms that try to cash in during these 
optimistic markets can be easily forced to exit the market.  
Investigating the dynamic nature of survival determinants allows us to see that there 
are very few factors whose effect does not change with time.  For the Internet retailing 
industry characterized by great transparency, this carries the fundamental implication that 
companies should constantly reinvent their strategies and operations in search of sustainable 
competitive advantages.  For the research community, the study demonstrates that time 
effects are important in a dynamic industry and they should not be ignored in future studies.
Table 1
Variable Definitions, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations*




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Exit – 1 if the company exits in a particular quarter, 0 
otherwise.
.02 .14 1
2. Order of Entry – time in fraction of the year after the first 
entrant in a category.
3.38 1.73 0.02 1
3. Growth Phase Entrant – 1 if date of entry earlier than date of 
maximum density, 0 otherwise.
.74 .44 0.05 -0.42 1
4. Single-Channel – 1 for Internet pure retailers, 0 otherwise. .36 .48 0.12 -0.15 0.37 1
5. Publicity – number of media mentions through the life of e-
tailer or through the end of the observation period.
168.12 685.74 -0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 1
6. Competitive Density – number of e-tailers in each quarter 
relative to the peak number of e-tailers in a category
.75 .24 0.07 0.43 -0.19 -0.10 0.02 1
7. Market Growth – moving average of change in electronic and 
mail-order sales from previous quarter in millions $
.52 .45 0.04 -0.13 0.14 0.13 -0.00 0.02 1
8. E-tailer Age – quarter-years since time of entry. 2.34 1.77 -0.02 -0.38 0.15 -0.03 0.07 0.22 -0.25 1
9. Public – 1 for publicly owned companies, 0 otherwise. .54 .50 -0.08 0.11 -0.27 -0.39 0.19 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 1
10. Digital Products – 1 for products with digital characteristics, 0 
otherwise.
.29 .45 -0.01 -0.11 0.24 0.21 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.01 1
11. Search-Experience – scale from 1 to 10, 1 – search, 10 –
experience.
5.48 1.33 0.02 0.02 -0.20 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 0.02 -0.28 1
12. NASDAQ – opening value of the NASDAQ composite index in 
the month of entry divided by 1000.
2.05 .92 0.04 0.78 -0.40 -0.16 -0.09 0.37 -0.12 -0.35 0.09 -0.20 0.16 1
13. ΔNQ – change in average NASDAQ values from previous 
quarter
-3.49 431.04 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.64 -0.12 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.12 1
14. ΔGDP  change in GDP from previous quarter 68.01 55.91 -0.04 -0.12 0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.15 0.51 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.15 0.17 1
                                                
* The descriptive statistics are based on the reorganized dataset consisting of 7346 firm-quarter observations.
Table 2
Length of growth stage for product categories and category survivors and exits
Product category Growth stage in 
years
Operating Exits Total
Apparel 6.75 43  2 45
Auto parts 3.42*  5  0  5
Books 5.83 20  6 26
Department store & variety 7.34 25  8 33
Electronics 5.67 26 10 36
Food & drink 5.16 19 18 37
Gifts & specialty 4.92 17  9 26
Hardware 4.42 10  1 11
Health & beauty 4.42 44 27 71
Home & garden 3.92 16  9 25
Music 4.91 14  9 23
Office 0.59*  4  0  4
Pets 0.50*  2  2  4
Software 6.09 25 10 35
Sports 5.08 13  4 17
Toys 5.25 21 19 40
Video 4.84 12 10 22
Total     316     144     460
* Only 4-5 firms per category.
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Table 3







Digital Public Private Growth Mature
1 year 92% 97% 83% 90% 98% 98% 85% 91% 94%
2 years 83% 94% 67% 80% 92% 94% 71% 80% 90%
5 years 67% 86% 44% 66% 72% 82% 53% 62% 85%
7 year 59% 84% 32% 60% 59% 69% 48% 53% 85%
Exitors 144 34 110 110 34 39 105 129 16
Survivors 316 240 76 241 75 197 119 192 123
Log-rank test for 
equality of survivor 
functions
chi2(3) = 100.30 
Pr>chi2 = 0.00
chi2(3) = 1.23             
Pr>chi2 = 0.27
chi2(1) = 43.00         
Pr>chi2 = 0.00
chi2(1) = 18.13          
Pr>chi2 = 0.00
Table 4
Survival rates by order of entry.
All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th >10
1 year 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 91% 94% 100% 85% 89%
2 years 83% 93% 94% 100% 93% 93% 94% 91% 78% 100% 69% 79%
5 years 67% 85% 76% 82% 84% 80% 70% 82% 56% 77% 37% 67%
7 year 59% 44% 63% 68% 84% 72% 63% 82% 56% na na na























Constant -8.24 (0.76)*** -- -9.47 (0.76)*** --
Order of entry (H1) 0.27 (0.14)** 0.25 (0.13)* -- --
Order of entry*E-tailer age (H1) -0.12 (0.05)** -0.11 (0.05)** -- --
Growth phase (H2) -- -- 0.62 (0.32)* 0.63 (0.32)**
Single-channel (H3) 1.65 (0.24)*** 1.65 (0.24)*** 1.50 (0.25)*** 1.50 (0.25)***
Publicity (H4) -0.001 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)**
Competitive density (H5) 2.01 (0.68)*** 2.10 (0.66)*** 1.73 (0.66)*** 1.79 (0.63)***
Market growth (H6) 1.71 (0.52)*** 1.52 (0.48)*** 1.71 (0.53)*** 1.48 (0.49)***
E-tailer age (H7) 0.72 (0.32)** -- 1.12 (0.33)*** --
E-tailer age2 (H7) -0.12 (0.04)*** -- -0.15 (0.04)*** --
Public (H8) -1.20 (0.38)*** -1.15 (0.38)*** -0.99 (0.40)** -0.96 (0.39)**
Public*E-tailer age (H8) 0.39 (0.11)*** 0.37 (0.11)*** 0.35 (0.12)*** 0.34 (0.12)***
Digital (H9) -1.18 (0.36)*** -1.14 (0.35)*** -1.07 (0.38)*** -1.02 (0.37)***
Digital*E-tailer age (H9) 0.33 (0.12)*** 0.30 (0.12)** 0.27 (0.12)** 0.24 (0.12)**
Search (H10) 0.11 (0.06)* 0.11 (0.06)* 0.10 (0.06) 0.10 (0.07)
GDP growth (H11) -0.01 (0.002)*** -0.01 (0.002)*** -0.01 (0.002)*** -0.01 (0.002)***
NASDAQ growth (H11) -1.69 (0.46)*** -1.56 (0.37)*** -1.61 (0.41)*** -1.39 (0.36)***
NASDAQ (H12) -- -- 0.73 (0.16)*** 0.83 (0.17)***
NASDAQ*E-tailer age (H12) -- -- -0.27 (0.09)*** -0.31 (0.10)***
LL -564.87 -697.63 -559.88 -691.84
Wald χ2 288.53 263.46 342.36 300.75
AIC          1161.74         1421.25          1153.76           1411.68
*** Coefficients significant at 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%
Figure 1
Factors Affecting E-tailer Survival1
                                                
1 Based on the conceptual framework of Varadarajan and Yadav (2002).  Dotted relationships are not included in 
the current model.  See endnote 1 for additional comments.
* Time-varying coefficient; ** Time-varying covariate.
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The hazard rate is the probability of failure in the next interval of time conditional on 
surviving to that time:
);|Pr( itiiit XtTtTh  (1a)
where Xit is a vector of covariates for firm i at quarter t that may vary with time and T is the 
discrete random variable indicating the time when a firm exits the industry.  Since there are 
38 quarters in the data, t assumes values from 1 to 38.  Deriving the probability from the 
continuous proportional hazards regression, we have:
)]exp(exp[1 ittit Xαh  (2a)
which can be re-written as the cloglog function:
(3a)
where 
t  is the baseline hazard.  This is identical to the continuous proportional hazards 
model where we have the following expression for the hazard function:
(4a)
In both cases 
t  is an unspecified function of time.  Specifying t  is in fact specifying the 
probability distribution of time.  For example, if 
t  is a constant, then we have the 
exponential distribution.  The flexibility of the discrete formulation allows us also to express 
t  as a polynomial in t. 










where i is a censoring indicator which equals 1 if the observation is uncensored and 0 if it’s 
censored.  The appropriate substitutions to arrive to the log-likelihood function, which is the 
    itt Xith 1log-log
 itt XXth ),(log
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where yij equals one if a firm exits in time j, zero otherwise, i.e. for survivors it is 0 for all 
periods and for the firms that exit, it is 0 for all periods up to the one in which they exit, when 
y becomes 1.  Thus, we have constructed the likelihood function of a standard binary 
dependent variable model (yij) with all the underlying assumptions where the unit of analysis 
is firm-quarter.  In this way, we can use standard software to estimate the model, the only 
requirement being the different organization of the data.  
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Endnotes
                                                
1 There are two reasons for not including buyer characteristics in the model. First, there are
no specific publicly available data.  Second, in terms of strategy formulation and performance 
outcomes, buyer characteristics tend to be industry specific.  Thus, a study conducted in a 
single industry would not exhibit great variation in buyer characteristics.  Examples of such 
buyer or buying environment characteristics provided by Varadarajan and Yadav (2002) 
include individual vs. organizational, non-trivial information search costs, low cost 
transparency, one to many vs. many to many communication models, etc. 
2 It is important to note that early entry advantages are not purely a function of less 
competition.  The formative stages of an industry are associated with legitimacy issues. Thus, 
switching to competitors may bear higher risks for consumers than at later stages.  For 
example, it was riskier to switch from Amazon to a competitor 10 years ago than it is today.  
Other factors that can contribute to early movers’ advantages during the “waiting” period are 
technology cost and know-how, better financing, as well as some harder to imitate features.
3 It is important to note that products with digital characteristics are not necessarily falling on 
the search end of the continuum.  For example, books and movies have to be consumed 
before full evaluation is possible.  In confirmation of this observation, the correlation in the 
sample between digital and search is 28%.
4 In their sample of 382 Internet-related IPOs Botman et al. (2004) register only 13 firms that 
were not listed on NASDAQ.  In the sample used for the current study, 45% of the publicly 
traded companies are listed on NASDAQ with only one of the single-channel e-tailers not 
being listed on NASDAQ.  Exemplary of the trading activity of e-commerce firms is a quote 
from Ofek and Richardson (2002, p.266): “For example, consistently through the 1998-2000 
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period, pure-play Internet firms represented as much as 20 percent of the dollar volume in the 
public equity market even though their market capitalization never exceeded 6 percent.”
5 I am grateful to Steven Klepper for this suggestion.
6 The separation of age and time effects has been a complex issue in the organizational 
literature.  Generally, time effects can be separated into age, cohort, and period effects.  For a 
detailed discussion, the reader is directed to Aldrich’s chapter on organizations and social 
change (Aldrich 1999).  Interpreting the pure effects of aging, cohorts, and periods, as noted 
by Aldrich (1999), requires sophisticated research designs and coverage of long periods of 
populations’ history, which is not the goal of the current study.  The main goal of 
evolutionary analysis is to study transformation in organizations through time.  In this sense, 
the age variable in the model serves as a proxy for the transformations experienced by firms.  
7 In general, there are no ready-made solutions to the multicollinearity problem.  Among the 
most often suggested solutions are either variable transformation or not including one of the 
correlated variables in the model (Menard 2001).  Since no variable transformations solved 
the collinearity problem between the order of entry and the NASDAQ variables, the variables 
are modeled in two separate equations.  While this is not a perfect solution, it is a way to 
show the effect of both variables on the survival probabilities of e-tailers.  To test whether 
this approach introduces any unobserved biases, a random effects model was estimated, but it 
did not indicate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (see also endnote 8).
8 As mentioned earlier, some relationships in Varadarajan and Yadav’s (2002) organizing 
framework (the dotted lines in Fig. 1) are not included in the model.  This can create a 
potential problem with endogeneity since the errors of the covariates are not independent any 
more.  Following Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), a multivariate probit model was estimated to 
test for cross-equation correlations (the code from the authors is available for free download).  
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This method is used to test for possible endogeneity between the different elements of the 
model.  For example, elements of competitive strategy may be dependent on other variables 
in the model like product and firm characteristics or the macro environment.  For this 
purpose, the equations are estimated jointly and the effect of the endogenous variables is 
captured by the cross-equation correlations.  None of the cross-equation correlations was 
significant, which increases the confidence that the model used in the current study is not 
misspecified.  As another precaution, the model is estimated accounting for unobserved firm-
specific factors assuming Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity.  Since the value of 
the Gamma variance is virtually 0 (0.000045), there are no signs of unobserved heterogeneity 
and the model is estimated as described in the Model section of the paper.
9 The STATA 8.0 option “cluster” was used for the estimation of robust standard errors to 
account for dependency of firm-quarter observations.  It is an extension of the Huber-White 
sandwich robust variance estimator.  For the purpose, the data are partitioned into groups 
corresponding to the 460 observations – such that the observations are correlated within 













where Vˆ is the estimator for the variance of maximum likelihood estimates and )(G
ku is the 
contribution of the kth e-tailer (Buckley and Westerland 2004).  
10 A model testing the U-shape relationship found in some studies was estimated.  However, 
the multicollinearity caused by the presence of the quadratic term is quite severe resulting in 
unreliable coefficient estimates.  Nevertheless, a plot of the empirical logits against the 
competitive density variable suggests that the effect is best approximated by a linear 
relationship.
